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Some Lessons from the Patent Law
Stephen L. Cartert
At a conference not long ago, I met a professor from another law school
who writes, as I sometimes do, about the efforts of the legal system to mediate
the conflicts that arise between religion and society. Like me, she is a critic of
the way the law currently deals with these conflicts, fearing, as I do, that the
legal culture tends to trivialize and denigrate religious devotion. So one might
have thought we would have a lot in common. So did I, and I anticipated a
fruitful discussion of our shared scholarly interest-until the conversation took
a disturbing turn.
My new acquaintance told me that she was familiar with two of my articles
touching on religion and society. But only one of them, she told me, was
clearly written by someone who is black. Had she known that I was black, she
said, she would have gotten so much more out of the other one.1 Puzzled, I
asked why this should be so. She seemed surprised at the question. It would,
she said, have placed the argument in its proper perspective. This answer,
however, only increased my bewilderment. Why, I asked, could she not simply
take the argument as it was, evaluating it without regard to the color of my
skin? Because, she explained patiently, she needed a context in which to
evaluate the argument. Only then, she added gently, might we have a real
conversation.2
I found this saddening, and I told her so. In the guise of bringing us
together, I suggested, her philosophy (and not only hers!) was actually pushing
us apart. The reason, I said, is that she was saying, in effect, "Tell me about
yourself, and then we can have a real conversation." My vision of scholarship,
and indeed of life, works the other way around, shedding preconceptions in
favor of something like: "Let's have a conversation, and that is how I will learn
about you." Certainly the professor was right that knowledge of my skin color
t William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale University. As always, I am grateful to Enola Aird.
1. The import of my new friend's claim, although I did not pursue it, was that she assumed that the
author of the article in question was white, which, in scholarship as in all professions, is the default value
for individuals whose colors are unknown.
2. The article that was, according to my new friend, clearly written by someone black was Carter,
Loving the Messenger, 1 YALE J.L. & HuM. 317 (1989), an essay on the conversion of black activist Julius
Lester to Judaism. The article that did not reveal its author's color was Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism,
and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987 DUYE L.. 977.
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would have placed the article in a context, but what context would it have
been? Had she known that I was black, she might have attached all sorts of
significance to what we might call the colorless article, but the significance
would have been born of her conception of the meaning of blackness, not
necessarily mine; the possibility that she missed is that the article included
everything that I thought important for understanding the I who was writing.
She wanted me as the author to tell her the things that she considered important
about the you who was writing. (I noticed, for example, that although both of
the articles in question were at least in part about religion, she did not seem
bothered that I did not identify my religious faith, if any, in either one.) My
answer is that the you is discovered in the process of reading, but my new
friend, perhaps unsurprisingly in this deconstructionist era, had her very pro-
found doubts.
The odd thing is that the one claim that seemed absolutely inadmissible is
that the argument in either article might stand on its own. Evidently, there is
no "on its own" any longer. Not only must one know the context, one must
know the author. The more one knows about the author, the less work one has
to do to evaluate the argument. And much of the time, it seems, one of the
most important facts to know about the author is the author's race, by which,
in America, we mean skin color.
I am troubled by the increasing number of academics who seem very
serious about the idea that knowledge of the author's race helps create a better
context for understanding the author's argument, not just on subjects relating
to race, but on other subjects as well; the article that my new friend thought
needed a context was, after all, about religion, not race. Last year I prepared
a rather lengthy analysis of the role of the International Trade Commission in
policing claims of software piracy.3 Should I have stated my race on the face
of the article? My race and perhaps other aspects of my history-to give it a
"context"? (A sympathetic bond with the oppressed people of the Third World
perhaps?) Might the careful reader glean these without my assistance? Or did
I hide my true and best voice, the voice of color, under a patina of whiteness?
As I read Alex Johnson's rich but perplexing article,4 the answer might
well be the last. Johnson's article, styled as a reaction to one essay of mine on
some of the difficulties of affirmative action and a longer piece by Randall
Kennedy on evaluation of scholarship,6 is an effort to find a measure of com-
mon ground in the debate over the interaction between the experience of racial
3. Carter, Gaining Without Venturing: The New Section 337 and the New Software Protections, in
TECHNOLOGY, TRADE & WORLD COMPETITION: PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WrITH TRADE
SANCTIONS 93-134 (1990).
4. Johnson, The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007 (1991).
5. Carter, The Best Black, and Other Tales, 1 RECONSTRUCTION No. 1, 1990, at 6. A modified version
of this essay appears as chapter 3 in S. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY
(forthcoming 1991).
6. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1745 (1989).
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discrimination in the United States and the actual work of legal scholars. The
argument is of considerable importance, not only because it ultimately bears
on questions of faculty hiring and tenure, but because it addresses what Kenneth
Clark has described as a fundamental question in a civilized society: how to
measure excellence.7
To the extent that Johnson's argument is that every writer is influenced by
his or her background, what he says is of course indisputable. It is when
Johnson moves beyond that proposition to begin to talk about "majoritarian"
and "white male" standards that my perplexity begins-perplexity not only
about what he supposes the standards for evaluating scholarly excellence should
be, but also about his message for scholars like myself, who, according to
Johnson, choose different scholarly voices for different scholarly occasions.
The process of categorization, whatever its benefits in analytic efficiency,
has become one of the great tragedies of our age. If the proper label can be
found for another person's views or work, there is scarcely any need for
argument; certainly there is little need to engage with what another person has
actually written. I believe in dialogue; I believe in people talking to each other
rather than around each other or to caricatures of each other. Too often in our
unhappy world, people whose disagreements run deep decide that the time to
talk has passed-even when conversation as a means to resolve their differences
has not even been tried. It was my commitment to open and serious dialogue,
I think, that more than anything else moved me to enter the academic world.
Perhaps I was naive, but I genuinely wanted to work among people whose joy
was talking about ideas.
Nowadays, however, a great deal of academic dialogue turns out to be not
about the ideas that people express but about the people who express the ideas.
It isn't what one says that matters, it is who is doing the saying. This is the
problem I had with the professor who said she would have gotten more out of
one of my articles had I told the reader I was black; she might have seen the
label as an aid to understanding, but my suspicion is that such "context"
actually makes it easier for the reader to disengage from the writer. The more
assumptions one can attach to the author before the process of reading begins,
the greater the number of biases and preconceptions that one will bring to the
reading itself. And the greater the number of biases and preconceptions the
reader brings along, the lower the probability that true communication might
occur.
Alex Johnson's article is very much in this tradition of scholarship about
scholars. Just consider the jargon scattered through it: Majoritarian. Voice of
Color. Neutrality. Hierarchical. Exclusion. Difference. White Male. Objectivity.
String enough of these code words together and they almost make an argument
in themselves; except that the kind of argument they make is one not about the
7. See K. CLARK, The Duty of the Intellectual, in PATHOS OF POWER 19-20 (1974).
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relative merits of different scholarly ideas but about the various convenient
boxes into which different scholars might be stuffed. And one of the scholars
Johnson seems in a hurry to box is me.
According to Johnson, I am an elitist who has accepted what he calls the
"Hierarchical Majoritarian" standard for evaluating legal scholarship. Some-
times, it seems, I have written in the voice of color (or, as Johnson says, one
of the many voices of color). According to Johnson, my recent essay on
affirmative action, The Best Black, and Other Tales, was written in the voice
of color, even though others, writing in the same voice, might offer analyses
different from mine.8 I suppose that the professor I met who shared my interest
in religion and society would say that the article on religion that clearly identi-
fied my race was written in the voice of color, too. At other times, however,
I have evidently selected instead the voice of my "majoritarian" peers. Lest the
point be obscured by jargon, what Johnson is saying is that I sometimes write
like a white male instead of a black one.
Although Johnson is careful to insist that he sees nothing wrong and much
right with scholars who are people of color writing other than in the voice of
color,9 there is about his article a flavor of critique, a sense that the voice of
color is specially to be valued in a way that the majoritarian voice is not. I
suppose that I am old-fashioned to think so, but to suggest that the judgment
on the quality of a work of scholarship should turn in any way on the identity
of the scholar (I do not deny that sometimes it does) seems to violate what John
Hope Franklin, one of the preeminent historians of the twentieth century, has
called "a basic principle of scholarship-namely, that given the materials and
techniques of scholarship and given the mental capacity, any person could
engage in the study of any particular field." 10
In this brief essay, I do not plan to join the debate over the existence and
worth of a voice of color. (Johnson says that I have expressed doubts on both,
but that is not an accurate reading of my work.) Nor is it my intention to
engage in point-by-point rebuttal or even rejoinder. Instead, after a few para-
graphs to clarify some aspects of my views that I think Johnson has inadvert-
ently misstated, followed by a short comment on the notion that an author's
sympathies or affiliations are more important than the author's arguments, I will
spend the rest of this essay setting out in more detail what I only sketched in
the Best Black essay: what I consider the proper standard for academic tenure
in law schools-a standard, in my view, that does not turn on the perspective
from which an article is written or the subject that a scholar chooses to tackle.
The standard I propose, which is inspired in part by my years of teaching patent
8. Johnson, supra note 4, at 2016, 2035-37.
9. See id. at 2036-37. He makes the same point in more detail in a recent article. Johnson, Racial
Critiques of Legal Academia: A Reply in Favor of Context, 43 STAN. L. REV. 137, 159-61 (1990).
10. J. FRANKLIN, The Dilemma of the American Negro Scholar, in RACE AND HISTORY: SELECTED
ESSAYS 1938-1988, at 295, 301 (1989).
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law, would require of all scholarship that it fulfill the essential purpose of
adding to human knowledge, a deceptively simple test that would, I believe,
open new vistas for all scholars working to attain it.
II
Johnson says lots of things about what I have written, some of them kind,
some of them less so, and while I am not the sort to engage in a lengthy
defense of my own work (after all, readers who find the debate interesting can
actually look at the original source) it is useful to sort through some of his
more important assertions about my Best Black essay and my other scholarship,
because the presumed accuracy of what he says about my work is, in some
cases, an element of Johnson's argument. I am loath to summarize in a few
paragraphs what I have elsewhere set forth at length, but in this case, I think,
before proceeding to discuss what Johnson says about my work, it is useful to
take a moment and try to make both parts of my argument clear, since I fear
that Johnson's article, perhaps understandably, does not.
My principal claim in the Best Black essay-a claim that I do not take
Johnson to dispute-is that white people do judge black people by different
standards, and that even in academia, well meaning white people do advocate
the hiring of people of color whom they do not think would be good enough
if not for skin color." This is what I mean by what I call the "best black
syndrome": the tendency of many white people to establish two categories for
excellence, one for the people who are the best and another for the black people
who are the best. Underlying the best black syndrome, I contend, is an assump-
tion that black people cannot compete intellectually with white people, an
assumption I find offensive and one I emphatically reject. Most of the argumen-
tation and all of the examples in the essay are devoted to setting out the costs
of the syndrome, as well as explaining how it is often reinforced by the rhetori-
cal style of some (but not all) arguments in favor of affirmative action.
My subsidiary claim-the one that Johnson takes as his text-is that it is
possible to develop a standard for judging scholarship that does not turn on
color or voice. This, I assume, is what leads to his charge that I have adopted
what he calls the Hierarchical Majoritarian standard for judging scholarly
quality. Why he imagines that I suppose the standard that I defend in the essay
to be the standard that is already applied by institutions dominated by white
professors I have no idea, for, in my discussion of what I call the "star system,"
I sharply criticize the favoritism and elitism that work to the disadvantage of
teaching candidates who are not white and who may be just as good as white
candidates who are hired because they have the right friends.12 As an approach
11. See Carter, The Best Black, and Other Tales, supra note 5, at 7-9.
12. Id. at 7-9, 26-29.
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to faculty hiring, or to advancement in any other profession, the star system
is a racially exclusionary corruption of an otherwise defensible meritocratic
ideal, and I am appalled that so many of my colleagues, at Yale and elsewhere,
are untroubled at the notion of doing business this way.
Among my goals in the Best Black essay was to point the way toward a
better standard for evaluating scholarship, a standard that would not disadvan-
tage work of high quality, no matter what the author's perspective. 13 I will
shortly explain in more detail how my proposed standard would operate and
why I am confident that it would not disadvantage any serious scholarly
perspective. But first I must offer some brief commentary about the ways in
which a misreading of my work seems to have pushed part of Johnson's
response to it off the track.
The initial point that must be made is that Johnson styles the parts of his
article that concern my work as though he is critiquing my scholarship on race,
but he chooses to offer his critique only through a commentary on my Best
Black essay. In an important sense, this involves a trope, albeit a useful one
for his purposes. The essay is not the same as my scholarship; it is, for exam-
ple, devoid of footnotes. If his goal is to suggest to readers what my views are,
it would have been useful for him to discuss the best evidence of them, the
articles in which I discuss the principal issues that he raises.
I offer a single example of a question about my views that could have been
resolved by considering my other work. Johnson says that I "questionll the
existence and worth" of a distinctive voice of color, and (in something of a
contradiction) that I "equivocate" over its worth and existence. 14 In the essay
that he critiques, what I say about the point is this: "The argument over differ-
ence in scholarly perspective is too complex to rehearse here."' 5 The implica-
tion is that I have rehearsed it elsewhere, which, in fact, is true. Looking over
my other work in the area, I am not sure how Johnson could possibly believe
that I dispute, or even equivocate on, the proposition that black people and
white people are not the same, or that these differences will sometimes carry
over into the scholarly world as into any other. Not only have I never denied
the proposition, I have actually endorsed it, albeit not in the narrative essay that
Johnson has mysteriously chosen as the focus for his critique.
The interested reader might, for example, peruse my article entitled When
Victims Happen To Be Black, published in The Yale Law Journal two years
before the Best Black piece, in which I discuss the Goetz trial and capital
sentencing by making use of the distinction that Johnson says I doubt. 6 In
13. I realize that part of Johnson's quarrel is over the meaning, if there is one, of the word "quality,"
but I will come to that point presently.
14. Johnson, supra note 4, at 2012.
15. Carter, The Best Black, and Other Tales, supra note 5, at 31.
16. See Carter, When Victims Happen To Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420 (1988). Johnson does cite this
piece elsewhere in his article. See Johnson, supra note 4, at 2036 n.121.
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my article on Loving the Messenger, published in The Yale Journal of Law and
the Humanities one year before the Best Black piece, I explain that I do not so
much doubt the proposition of difference as worry about the harm I think will
very likely come of making too much of it.17 In that article, I also detail the
argument that I do not "rehearse" in the Best Black piece, suggesting that the
so-called voice of color takes many forms, some of them contradictory, span-
ning a spectrum from left to right.18 In a forthcoming book, Reflections of an
Affirmative Action Baby, I further explain the reasons that I think the trend
toward celebrating difference as a qualification or merit indicator is likely to
prove a tragic mistake.
Johnson repeatedly suggests that I have accepted a majoritarian vision of
some "objective" standard for evaluating scholarship. 19 There is no such
language in any of my relevant work, and, as I have said, I do not accept
someone else's vision of the criteria for evaluating scholarship: I offer my own.
I think, however, that Johnson and I may have a substantive disagreement on
the meaning of the word "objective," which is what transforms his suggestion
into the pejorative that he evidently means it to be. A principal focus of modem
scholarship, and not only in law, has been to assault the idea that one can
evaluate anything without significant reference to one's own values. Okay, point
taken, although this does not answer the question of what one should try to do.
The knowledge that perfectly unbiased observation is impossible should instill
in all of us a healthy degree of caution in the certainty of our rightness but,
eventually, one must move. There are reasons that scholars should strive for
dispassion, not the least of which is the importance of retaining a distinction
between is and ought. I am not sure how critique is possible if one lacks
accurate information, the is; and I am not sure how evaluation is possible if one
lacks a standpoint from which to pursue the ought. The alternative is morally
monstrous: suddenly no one is capable of judging anybody else.w° On this
point, I agree with Ronald Dworkin in hoping that we can stop tossing around
such words as "objectivity" as though they possess an agreed and substantively
negative content.21
17. Carter, Loving the Messenger, supra note 2.
18. Id. at 320-34. I do not claim to have originated the idea that there are many voices of color rather
than one. That I take to be a major point of Randall Kennedy's piece, Racial Critiques, supra note 6, as
well as an argument pressed for decades by black intellectuals from W.E.B. DuBois to Zora Neale Hurston
to James Baldwin to Henry Louis Gates. In his current article (and the previous Stanford Law Review article
on which he relies, Johnson, supra note 9, at 155-56) Johnson ringingly endorses the same proposition
although he for some reason seems to treat it as new.
19. See Johnson, supra note 4, 2016-17, 2035-37.
20. It is no answer to say that the victims of oppression will have the monopoly on judgment, because
if one does not believe in the possibility of neutrality in the sense of making moral judgment in accordance
with disciplining rules, there is no standpoint from which to determine who the victims are and who the
oppressors are-a matter very much at issue, for example, in the Persian Gulf War and, indeed, in the
Middle East generally.
21. See Dworkin, My Reply to Stanley Fish (and Walter Benn Michaels): Please Don't Talk About
Objectivity Any More, in THE PoLxrCS O INTEPPRETATION 287, 297-303 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed. 1983).
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Johnson further asserts that I "to a lesser degree" believe that quality is
shaped by professional consensus or that we do not know how much scholar-
ship is worth until we see the reaction of white professors to it.' Johnson
never offers any citations to my work in support of his statement that I believe
this. Since my view is that quality is intrinsic, I could hardly believe what he
suggests. For example, I do not suppose for a moment that the value of Johns-
on's article turns on whether it is published in The Yale Law Journal or any-
where else. My judgment on its quality certainly does not turn on whether
anybody else, black or white or any other color, likes it. Of course, if someone
thinks less of it than I do, or thinks more of some other article than I do, I am
happy to listen to argument, to engage on the issue, and even to have my mind
changed, for I am a believer in dialogue. But I do not imagine that professional
reception is by itself a mark of quality. What I do think one learns from
professional reception--and this is the point I was trying to make in the Best
Black piece-is what the profession thinks of the work.
I will plead guilty to caring about the professional reception of my work,
in the sense that I care about my reputation as a scholar. I do not imagine that
there are many scholars who do not care at all about their reputations, although
there are doubtless some. But although the reactions to my work from people
whose judgments I respect might shape my own opinion on the quality of my
work, that is not the principal reason that professional reaction matters. Johnson
misses, I think, the important distinction between the quality of a piece of
writing and the reward for a piece of writing. The reaction of colleagues is
obviously central to gaining reward, and the most useful way of pursuing a
positive reaction (assuming that the star system is unavailable) is to convince
one's colleagues of the quality of the work. But failure to convince one's
colleagues does not mean that the work is of low quality; it only means that
there will be no academic reward for it. Our task as participants in and observ-
ers of this system is to press for adoption of academic standards that will ensure
a closer correspondence (there will never be an identity) between value and
reward.
There is an irony here. The entire construct of Johnson's article is to
deny the possibility of neutrality and objectivity, which in turn would seem to
make it implausible to suggest that anything has intrinsic value. If this is
so-and this is an example of what I mean by the confusion over the proper
use of such words as "objective"--then no scholarly work is better than any
22. See Johnson, supra note 4, at 2016. Johnson also suggests that I "appear to be hostile to the
conception of the voice of color because of its potentially stigmatizing effect on the interpretation of
scholarship prepared by scholars of color." Id. at 2016. Although I am not sure just what Johnson means
by this, I suspect that he is suggesting that I fear that a perceived academic hostility toward the notion of
a voice of color will carry over into evaluations of my own work. If I read Johnson wrong, I am sorry; if
I read him right, his argument is a bit ad hominem for my taste, and, in any event, does not reflect my view.
No such suggestion appears in any of my work, which probably explains why he cites nothing in support
of his contention.
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other scholarly work, response is finally everything, and all the argument is
really about is whose response matters. This approach reduces the debate over
the voice of color to an argument over who gets to hand out the goodies, with
nothing, after all, to say about the quality of scholarship. If this is what he does
think (and, again, I may be misreading him), it is small wonder that he treats
the word "hierarchical" like an insult. But I hope that I read him wrong, for
I shudder to imagine a university faculty devoted explicitly to denying the
possibility of scholarly excellence.
In The Duty of the Intellectual, the thought-provoking essay that opens his
very fine book Pathos of Power, the renowned psychologist Kenneth Clark
makes the following observation:
An unfinished task of our society-probably one that must be clearly
identified, defined, and justified by intellectuals-is to learn to differen-
tiate between democratic philosophy, goals, and methods and stable
standards of excellence. Literalistic egalitarianism, appropriate and
relevant to problems of political and social life, cannot be permitted to
invade and dominate the crucial areas of the intellect, aesthetics, and
ethics .3
The point of the passage is perfectly straightforward and sensible: a commit-
ment to inclusionary politics bears no necessary relation to a judgment about
what is good and fine and right and what is bad and poor and wrong. To me,
as a member of a university faculty, this proposition is sometimes a difficult
one to bear in mind because of the remarkable force of the idea of leveling as
a methodology for considering the quality of scholarship: in the academy in
these days of doubt, there are people, many of them, who believe that the
pursuit of excellence is impossible (or, as a professor at one of the nation's best
universities has suggested, possible but immoral) and comparative judgments
are a bad joke.
I do not want to see the discussion over the relationship between scholarship
and experience transformed into a part of the same movement. At present, it
plainly is not. The conversation is about how one judges scholarly excellence,
not over whether scholarly excellence is possible. Should the perspective from
which an article is written be weighed in the balance of quality or not? This,
I think, is an important conversation, one that Randall Kennedy has entered into
quite forcefully in the Harvard Law Review article that has earned him so
many inappropriate brickbats. My answer to the question is no, for the reasons
stated by Franklin,' but, as I will explain presently, this functional judgment
bears no relation to the aesthetic questions of value that seem to drive so much
of Johnson's argument. My concern is that Johnson's approach might well leave
23. K. CLARK, supra note 7, at 20.
24. See Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1801-07.
25. See L FRANKLIN, supra note 10, at 301.
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the impression that the debate is over not how one judges quality but whether
quality can be judged.
Finally, let me put the record straight on a more sensitive point. Johnson
accuses me, at least implicitly, of believing that the work of scholars of color
is not as good as the work of other scholars.26 Here, I think, he has caught
me out, but I plead guilty only to inadequate phraseology. A principal argument
in the Best Black essay was that people of color who would do just as well as
people who are white are excluded through the "star system" to which I
adverted above.' At the same time, I argued that people who are hired even
though they are not expected to be good scholars are less likely to do good
scholarship than people hired because they are, if-a big if-the people doing
the hiring have in place a good system for assessing scholarly promise.18 In
a footnote I tried to make clear that I was speaking of judgments of quality
made by others (in this case the hypothetical faculty), not about something
intrinsic, and that my only strong claim was that the others were entitled to
their opinions.29 But a footnote, apparently, is not enough caution when one
proceeds, as I did in that piece, to spin a lengthy hypothetical that takes the
footnote's assumption as its starting point. Evidently, it is possible to read my
argument, as many people did, as suggesting that I harbor doubts about the
abilities of scholars of color.30 That was not my intention, but the fact that I
labored the hypothetical plainly made it easy for the reader to gain this impres-
sion. This was an unfortunate error in judgment, one that caused pain and
anguish to many people, and I am sorry for it.31
There is a point here worth emphasizing, however. There is an important
difference between the claim that the standards that law schools use in evaluat-
ing scholarship are corrupt and the claim that the standards that law schools
use are racially exclusionary. In discussing the star system, I was concerned
principally with one area in which I think that the standards are both. The claim
that Johnson presses, however, is not that the standards are corrupt and
exclusionary but that they are biased and exclusionary;32 in other words, that
by applying their Hierarchical Majoritarian standard, law schools adopt a
standard that can be applied in a rational manner (which the star system cannot)
but that works to exclude scholarly perspectives that, according to Johnson, the
academy should instead be embracing.
26. See Johnson, supra note 4, at 2013-14.
27. See Carter, The Best Black, and Other Tales, supra note 5, at 26-29.
28. Id. at 30.
29. Id. at 30 n.2.
30. Among those who have read my Best Black essay this way is Girardeau Spann, a law professor
at Georgetown, whose letter appears, along with my rejoinder, in Reconstruction. See Spann, Correspon-
dence, 1 RECONSTRUCTION No. 2, 1990, at 2-3, 5-6.
31. When a revised version of the essay is published in my book, the extended hypothetical will be
omitted.
32. See Johnson, supra note 4, at 2014-15.
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I have not defended in the past, and will not defend now, the standards that
law schools use to evaluate scholarship, although I must admit a degree of
puzzlement over the notion that this amorphous group, white males,,actually
shares one or even a small subset of standards. After nearly a decade of sitting
through faculty meetings and listening to my colleagues discussing scholarship,
I am quite certain that there is no such animal as the "majoritarian perspective"
on these matters, and, if there ever was one, that it is long extinct. In truth,
however, I doubt that the claim of a majoritarian perspective is central, or even
important, to the critical argument. Rather, the critical argument must surely
be that the ability to appreciate a scholarly perspective is influenced by the
reader's background, and that the backgrounds of most of those who vote in
law school faculties, whatever their particular preferences in scholarship, make
them less likely to appreciate the work of those whose backgrounds are very
different. Without regard to the merits of this argument, it is surely a stronger
one than the assertion that those who vote share a set of preferences. They
surely do not; the most that could be claimed is that they share certain aver-
sions. The important issue for those who believe this to be true is what should
be done about it.
My view is that if one believes that a standard is biased and exclusionary,
the solution is not to suggest that another exclusionary standard be employed
alongside it, but rather to fight for a new standard that will not have the
problems of the old. Can this be done in the world of legal academia? If it
can't, I am prepared to stop voting on faculty appointments. As it happens,
however, I think it can, and I will turn in a moment to the design of such a
standard and the reasons for my confidence that what I propose would not
disadvantage any serious scholarly perspective. But first I must pause to say
a few words about the use, and misuse, of the idea of difference.
III
The most troubling aspect of Johnson's article, and of the entire debate over
voice, is the effort to sort out whose voice of color various scholars are using.
Thus, for example, I learn from Johnson that I "speak with a dialect of the
voice of color that may be reflective of color but not of class affiliation with
the poor and oppressed" and that I have "adopted the values of [my] majori-
tarian peers. '33
Wow! All of this from an essay about hiring standards in law schools? It
is hard to imagine that Johnson has, from a single piece of writing, figured out
so thoroughly where my sympathies lie, although that move, too, is common
in an era when deconstruction reigns. I think, however, that he is conflating two
separate points-where one's sympathies lie and what policies one advocates.
33. Id. at 2036.
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The notion that one can work out from my essay what my "class affiliations"
are is a little bit like the idea that one can decide from my position on the Gulf
War whether I am a patriot or not. Labels are useful tools for rousing emotions
and avoiding complexity, but I have found precious few that contribute much
to discussion.
Even if we assume, with Johnson, that it is possible to work out one's
"class affiliation" and "viewpoint" from an essay like mine, it isn't clear how
far this advances discussion. In the essay, I criticize affirmative action-not
oppose it, but criticize it. If it is Johnson's theory that criticism of (or even
opposition to) affirmative action signifies a lack of solidarity with the most
oppressed people of color, then he must further be assuming that affirmative
action has been of some assistance to the worst off among people of color, the
poor and oppressed that he describes. Unfortunately for that assumption, there
is no evidence that affirmative action has helped the most disadvantaged black
people, although there is considerable evidence that it has assisted the black
middle class, which is, I assume, the class with which Johnson has decided that
my affiliations lie.' On the other hand, there is considerable and largely
uncontroverted evidence that many and perhaps most black people oppose
affirmative action in the sense of preferential treatment, and the more the
programs emphasize different standards for black and white, the lower the level
of black support."a
Besides, can it really be Johnson's theory that the poor and the oppressed
have a special and monolithic view on this point? What, then, does one say to
the poor, oppressed person of color who is also a critic of affirmative action,
who proclaims herself ready and willing to meet and beat any standard that
white society places in her way and calls upon others to do the same? Is she
a class traitor?
The question is not hypothetical. What I hear from the poor and working
class black people that I know is an exhortation to do things that Johnson
would presumably say involve an adoption of majoritarian values: To excel by
beating white people at their own game. To prove that the standards that they
set up are no barriers to us. Stuff like that. Well, perhaps these are not the right
oppressed people, or perhaps they are brainwashed or do not have the right
34. For discussions of the evidence, see, e.g., T. SOWELL, PREFERENTIAL POLICIES: AN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 156-59 (1990); W. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED, THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 109-24 (1987). As I explain in my forthcoming book, the fact that racial preferences
operate principally to the benefit of the people of color who are already best off is not a decisive argument
against it. The fact does suggest, however, that it is a program of assistance for the middle classes and
should be discussed in that light, which in turn implies that support for or opposition to it bears no relation
to one's sympathies with the poorest and most oppressed members of the community. See S. CARTER,
REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY, supra note 5.
35. See, e.g., L. SIEGELMAN & S. WELCH, BLACK AMERICANS' VIEWS OF RACIAL INEQUALTY: THE
DREAM DEFERRED 126-32 (1991). For a fascinating collection of survey data presented in tabular form see
id. at 129.
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perspective. Perhaps only certain people of color, maybe even a small subset,
know what the authentic perspective of poor black people is.
Actually, we needn't guess at it. We have survey evidence, and lots of it.
We know, for example, that black people are somewhat more likely than white
people to oppose abortion. We know that black people are far more likely than
white people to believe that courts are too lenient in assessing the rights of
criminal suspects. And we know that black people are one of the strongest
demographic groups in the country in their support for organized classroom
prayer in public schools.36
My point is not that one who is interested in articulating the authentic
perspective of the truly oppressed people of color must come out in favor of
organized classroom prayer.37 My point, rather, is that even if there is an
authentic "perspective of the oppressed," I would hesitate to conclude that law
professors, of all the various folks one might imagine, are in the best position
to articulate it.38 If, however, law professors are going to articulate the per-
spective, it would be useful first to take the time to work out exactly what the
perspective is. What we should not do is assume that we know what it is
merely because we know what we want it to be.
The trouble with Johnson's approach, I fear, is that it glosses a bit too
lightly over the matter of the use to which the proposition of difference should
be put. Johnson seems to imagine that since he has, he believes, refuted Randall
Kennedy's arguments (or those he attributes to Kennedy) and demonstrated that
a voice of color exists, the different voice is ipso facto to be specially valued
for the unique perspective that it can bring. But it is the second point, not the
first, that forms the basis of Kennedy's argument: the claim that Kennedy
makes is that even if a voice of color exists, no one has demonstrated that it
offers a perspective that will otherwise be missed.39 I must confess that I do
not find any persuasive refutation of this claim so far in the extensive critical
literature that Kennedy's article has generated.' Part of the difficulty, howev-
er, is epistemological: Kennedy is demanding data for a point that many take
as intuitively obvious. The narrative form that critical race theorists sometimes
select is meant in some sense to be an argument in itself, presenting its own
challenge by its very existence: Could someone white have written this?, the
stories demand.
36. There are many sources of data supporting the relative conservatism of black Americans on most
social issues other than race. The particular examples in the text are drawn from data collected in NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 215 (1989).
37. I do think it useful, however, to bring to the attention of white scholars information on the role
of the church in the black community, something that many liberals, with their often over-zealous commit-
ment to the trivialization of religious faith, see Carter, Treating Religion as a Hobby, supra note 2, might
fail to understand or prefer to ignore.
38. Randall Kennedy offers a similar caution. See Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1788-1801.
39. Id. at 1775-78.
40. See, e.g., Responses to Randall Kennedy's Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 103 HARV. L REV.
1844 (1990); Delgado, Storytellingfor Opposidonists, 76 VA. L. REV. 95 (1990); Johnson, supra note 9.
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The implied question is entirely rhetorical; the reader is meant to understand
that the answer is No.41 And if the answer is No, then the story is saying
something that would not be a part of the debate were the voice in which it is
written not allowed to play a part. Consequently, the debate is impoverished
if the distinct voice of color is absent, which is said to be a reason to go and
seek the voice.
I have no doubt that people of color, forged in the crucible of racism, will
develop perspectives, politics, even aesthetics that will be at variance with those
of the larger culture. As I explain in my book, I have no quarrel with the
proposition that people of color and people who are white hold different
perspectives, both because it is trivially true that all people hold different
perspectives and because it is importantly true that the experience of oppression
has touched all black people of whatever status (albeit not to the same de-
gree).4 I do quarrel, however, with what I might call-to borrow Johnson's
phraseology-the hierarchical elitist standard of suffering, to wit, "I've suffered
more than you have, and therefore I know more about suffering than you do,
and therefore what I have to say about suffering is more valuable than what
you have to say about suffering." Judith Shklar has offered what seems to me
an apt rejoinder: "Victimhood happens to us: it is not a quality. '43
Even if one accepts the case for a unique voice of color, or even a range
of voices, one must be cautious about advocating any policy based on the
conclusion. For reasons that I explain in greater detail elsewhere, this line of
argument, although perfectly understandable and sometimes even plausible, is
potentially a recipe for disaster. 4 If we rely on intuition rather than data in
such matters, we are in a treacherous situation. After all, it is fine for one
theorist to say proudly and forcefully: People of color have a unique and
particularly valuable voice. As a logical matter, that is no different than the
statement, evidently believed by most white Americans, that people of color
have a unique and generally lower intelligence than white people.4 The fact
41. Daniel Lewis James, a.k.a. Danny Santiago, thought the answer was Yes, but his critics disagreed.
See Dunne, The Secret of Danny Santiago, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Aug. 16, 1984, at 17. On the other hand,
Shelby Steele, whose recent book, The Content of Our Character, has come in for sharp criticism from some
Critical Race Theorists, seems to me to be writing in precisely the storytelling mode that Johnson exalts.
For a discussion of Steele in this context, see Carter, The Logic of Racial Preferences, TRANSITION No. 51,
1991, at 158, 178 (reviewing S. STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER (1990)).
42. See S. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY, supra note 5, ch. 9.
43. J. SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES 17 (1984). For a detailed statement of my own views, see S. CARTER,
REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY, supra note 5, ch. 9; Carter, Loving the Messenger, supra
note 2, at 338; cf. P. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR 121
(1991) (suggesting that diversity "should not be understood as an attempt to replace an ideology controlled
by 'white men' with one controlled by 'black women'-or whomever. The real issue is precisely the
canonized status of any one group's control.").
44. See Carter, Loving the Messenger, supra note 2. This argument is also discussed in chapter 9 of
S. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY, supra note 5.
45. The most recent General Social Survey, a regular report of the widely respected National Opinion
Research Center, found that 53 percent of white respondents consider black people generally less intelligent
than white people. See Poll Finds Whites Use Stereotypes, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1991, at B 10, col. 6. Prior
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that the second statement is racist and the first is not does not create any logical
means for distinguishing one from the other."
There is an important point here, one that those who are concerned about
the possibility of racism in their white colleagues should not overlook. Even
as the voice of color gains a foothold in the academy, we have to be cautious
about assuming that anybody's mind has been changed. I do think that theorists
who are white, whether on the right or the left, tend to celebrate the work of
theorists who are not white when it agrees with their own predilections, but this
is not an endorsement of the value of diverse viewpoints; it is, whether con-
sciously it or not, nothing more than affirmative action in the old fashion. The
celebration is not of the quality of the argument but of the skin color of the
arguer. What many white intellectuals seem to like is an endorsement of their
views on race from a person of color.
This is one of the reasons that I worry when I see white professors nodding
sagely at the idea that their colleagues who are not white will bring into the
law schools the points of view of the truly disadvantaged. I do not doubt the
sincerity of white supporters, but I am a bit concerned about what they must
envision. I worry that as they await the introduction of this new and previously
excluded voice, they will actually be seeing their colleagues of color as, ac-
cording to James Baldwin, white audiences saw the black actors in Carmen
Jones. "[These are exceptional Negroes," wrote Baldwin, "as American, that
is, as you and me, interpreting lower-class Negroes of whom they, also, are
very fond.... ."47 Baldwin's point, I think, was that the introduction of what
might be called an interpretive class of black folk to mediate between lower-
class blacks and middle-class whites made it easier for whites to disengage
from the subjects of the interpretation. One is reminded of Spiro Agnew's line,
"You don't learn about poverty from people who are poor, but from experts
who have studied the problem." If it is to be the task of scholars of color to
articulate the perspectives of the poor and the oppressed, I suspect that the
comfort level of liberal white colleagues will be increased, not decreased. And
if the perspective that the interpreters articulate turns out to be something to
the left of the authentic one-school prayer, fewer rights for criminal defen-
dants, and the rest-the comfort will be greater still.
surveys through the late 1960's had shown a decline in the percentage of white respondents who consider
black people less intelligent. Historical polling results on the attitudes of white Americans about black
Americans are collected in NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 36, at 118-24. For a more detailed
discussion of data collected during the 1980's, see L. SIEGELMAN & S. WELCH, supra note 35, at 85-100.
46. See Carter, When Victims Happen To Be Black, supra note 16, at 434, wherein I also suggest
possibilities for distinguishing among propositions of this kind, although I further explain why the simple
argument that some of them are racist turns out to offer little guidance.
47. . BALDWIN, Carmen Jones: The Dark Is Light Enough, in NOTES OF A NATIVE SON 46 (1955)
(emphasis in original).
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IV
The trouble with the argument over scholarly voice is that it is a battle over
the wrong issue. The value of scholarship should not turn on the approach that
a scholar takes, the perspective that a scholar articulates, or the style in which
a scholar writes. The value of scholarship is a function of the purpose of the
scholarship and the skill with which the purpose is carried out.
My view of how one judges the quality of scholarship rests on a simple
axiom: The purpose of scholarship is to increase human knowledge. The
corollary is that the greater the degree of the contribution to human knowledge,
the greater the value of a particular scholarly work. Any test for scholarly
quality, then, should rest on answering the question: Does this scholarship
increase human knowledge, and if so, by how much?
Johnson seems to suggest that scholarship by people of color in the distinc-
tive voice of color is inherently valuable.4 I would rather put the point differ-
ently. A more serious version of the claim would hold that scholarship by
people of color about oppression with which they have had experience is more
likely than work by white scholars to make a fresh and distinctive contribution
to human knowledge.49 The reason it makes a difference to state the matter
as a probability is that, so stated, it is at best a guideline for those planning to
write; it has no message for those seeking to read. So stated, the claim is about
the value of a genre. It makes no claim about the value of any particular piece
of work within the genre, and each piece of scholarship must, therefore, be
evaluated on its own.
An example might make the point. When I was in the eleventh grade, my
English teacher, obviously no statistician, told the class that Hamlet was the
greatest play in the English language. Her argument was twofold: Shakespeare,
she said, was the greatest English-language playwright, and Hamlet, she added,
was Shakespeare's greatest play.
The argument, of course, doesn't work. Tennessee Williams could be a
lesser playwright than Shakespeare and A Streetcar Named Desire still a better
play than Hamlet.O0 The distinction that my teacher was missing is between
a median and a distribution. It is possible that Shakespeare's plays cluster
around a higher median quality point but Williams still wrote one play well
beyond his median level, and beyond Shakespeare's too.
With the voice of color literature, the same example works. Assume the
truth of the arguments for the existence and value of a distinct voice of color.
This might imply that Scholar White would ordinarily have less to contribute
48. See Johnson, supra note 4, at 2040-61.
49. Cf. Williams, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping in Singular Times, 103 HARV. L. REV.
525 (1990) (suggesting that case for racial diversity in ownership of broadcast facilities rests on likelihood,
not certainty, that people of different cultural backgrounds will make different programming choices).
50. I make no claim concerning the relative merits of the plays or the playwrights.
2080 [Vol. 100: 2065
HeinOnline -- 100 Yale L.J. 2080 1990-1991
Tenure Standards
to the study of law and race than Scholar Black, but that would say at best that
Scholar White's work clusters around a lower median point. The distinction
would provide no basis for a comparative evaluation of any particular article
by Scholar White against any particular article by Scholar Black-any more
than the presupposition that Scholar Quick is brighter than Scholar Slow should
provide a basis for a comparative evaluation of any particular article by Scholar
Quick against any particular article by Scholar Slow. You can't tell the answer
until you read the work.
I labor this argument because I want to make clear why nothing about the
quality of a particular piece of scholarship turns on whether one accepts or
rejects the argument for a distinct and valuable voice of color, nor, if one
accepts the argument, on what one imagines that the distinct and valuable voice
of color is, or on one's view about whether there is a best authentic voice of
color or there are multiple voices, all of them equally authentic and valuable,
as Johnson proposes.51 No matter the probable value of any particular scholar-
ly contribution, one must still finally evaluate it; and it is in the process of that
evaluation, I contend, that standards can and should be universalized.52
I lack the space to set forth in detail my view on what makes some scholar-
ship good and some scholarship bad, but it is worth mentioning what should
be two very basic requirements, because both are all too often lacking in some
of the writing held up to me by colleagues of all backgrounds and political
persuasions as reflecting work of the sort that they believe a place like the Yale
Law School ought to "include."
The first of these is that a scholar must know a field. A scholar must be
familiar with the work that has gone before, the giants or midgets or simply
regular folk on whose shoulders she necessarily stands. This means that serious
scholars should not, for example, cite old mythologies or their own instincts
as though they are facts. To take a single example, I am constantly astounded
at the number of students who write papers, and the number of law professors
who write articles, assuming quite casually that Southern chattel slavery
destroyed the family and value structure of its black victims. Once upon a time
that was virtually holy writ, but after the work of Herbert Gutman, 53 Eugene
Genovese,' and others, every serious historian is aware of the mountain of
evidence suggesting that despite their many other predations, slaveholders
usually left family structures intact. At the very least, one would hope that a
serious scholar adhering to the old idea would take the time to explain why the
consensus among professional historians is wrong.
51. See Johnson, supra note 4, at 2012-20.
52. To say that there are standards is not, of course, to say that the process is mechanistic; but the
critics must be wary of stating the converse, that because the process is not mechanistic, it must not have
any standards.
53. See H. GurMAN, THE BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERy AND FREEDOM 1750-1925, at 257-326 (1976).
54. See E. GENOVEsE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 450-58 (1974).
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Similarly, any number of law review articles make factual assumptions or
assertions without giving the slightest indication that the author has even tried
to find out if anyone has ever tested the proposition in question empirically.
No one, I hope, would insist that anybody cite everything, and no scholar is
under any obligation to agree with previous work, or even to consider it
important. But when an article with scholarly pretensions ignores large bodies
of relevant work entirely, the critic properly questions the intellectual serious-
ness with which the work was undertaken.
The second point about good scholarship is that it should not only do
something that is different from what past work has done, it should also make
claims that are not obvious in light of past work. A serious and innovative
scholar searches for more than the way that anybody with a particular scholarly
bent would address the particular problem to which she has turned her attention.
The standard that work must be new is simply a matter of what the law reviews
sometimes call preemption: Did the writer think of this idea first or is it already
in the literature? A writer who consistently repeats what has already been
written is not advancing human knowledge.
The standard that a work must not be obvious is, if anything, forgotten more
often than the point that the scholar must learn the field. Again, I am more than
a little discouraged when my colleagues put forth as examples of analytical
brilliance work that any competent scholar applying the tools in question to the
problem in question would have produced. I do not deny that some very good
work may be entirely derivative in nature; but the most important, most innova-
tive work is not, and the most innovative scholars define themselves by the
originality, not just the novelty, of their conceptions. For that reason, the test
is not whether the scholar's idea would have been obvious to the very best
scholar in the field, but whether it would have been obvious to the ordinary
scholar in the field.55
Nor is the application of this principle something outside the range of
human judgment. This is precisely the test that is applied when an individual
seeks a patent on an invention. If, in the judgment of the Patent Office or a
reviewing court, the invention at the time it was made would have been obvious
to an individual of ordinary skill in the field, a patent must be denied. The
patent system, for all of its faults, has managed over time to digest the "non-
obviousness" requirement rather well. There is no reason to think that law
faculties, or other university faculties, should do any worse in applying it and
there is no inherent reason to suppose that it must be entirely arbitrary in its
application.
As it happens, the federal law of patents includes models for both parts of
my second standard. Section 101 of the Patent Act grants a patent to anyone
55. As one might expect. this test makes it harder to do good scholarship in crowded fields. In a market
where candidates seriously want to be hired, this result should push people into relatively empty fields-not
a bad idea.
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who "invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,"56
subject to other restrictions contained in the Act. For my purposes, the key
restrictions are two: first, the requirement under section 102 that the invention
be novel in the sense that nobody else thought of it first 7 and, second, the
prohibition under section 103 on a patent for an invention when "the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that
the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the inven-
tion was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains. 58
The section 102 requirement of novelty is understood in the law schools-I
have already mentioned the concept of preemption-although I often hear
excuses made for various scholars' repeating what has already been said before.
One of my favorites went something like this: "Well, maybe he didn't know
there was another article about it, so he still thought of it himself, so you have
to give him credit for having the smarts to work it out!" (It's amazing the
twists that the star system will make to protect its own!) The trouble with the
excuse is that a scholar who doesn't know what work has been done in the field
does not deserve credit for being lazy, and as for being smart, that is not part
of the test for scholarly quality; the fact that a person is smart does not mean
that the person has added anything to human knowledge.
The section 103 requirement is less understood, but it is just as important.
The rule is that when one sets on one side the prior art-what existed in the
field at the time the invention was made-and sets on the other the invention
itself, the differences between the two-the advance that the invention makes
over the art-must not have been obvious at the time of invention to an inven-
tor of ordinary skill.59 The essential point of the section is this: The smaller
the increase in human understanding as a result of an invention, the weaker the
case for a patent. By analogy, it rarely increases human understanding to turn
well-understood analytic tools on a familiar problem and come up with a
perfectly competent treatment that any scholar of ordinary skill would have
done by applying the same tools to the same problem.
This is not to suggest that no scholarship is good scholarship unless it does
something that few scholars would have thought to do; rather, the point is that
the more distinctive and unusual the problem solved, or the solution offered,
the greater the increase in human knowledge, and, therefore, the higher the
quality of the scholarship. The patent law recognizes this point through its
56. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
57. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
58. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
59. Because the test is the inventor of ordinary skill, it does not matter that the inventor in question
was savvy enough to develop the invention, nor that a few of the brightest people in the field might have
invented it too had they but turned their minds to the same question. See Standard Oil Co. v. American
Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 453-55 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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award of greater protection from infringement to "pioneer patents"--patents
on inventions that open up bold new avenues of exploration. 60
Nor do I suggest that any scholar exceeds these guidelines all the time, or,
indeed, very often; certainly I make no such claim for my own work.61 But
my claim is not that every article must, in effect, deserve a patent if it is to be
adjudged a good piece of work; my claim, rather, is that the works of scholar-
ship that can meet the patent test are better-add more to human knowl-
edge-than the works that cannot. So if one wants to argue the relative merits
of different scholarly works, the patent law tests of novelty and nonobviousness
provide useful and workable starting points.
Taking the patent law as a model would provide the crucial link between
the purpose of scholarship-the advancement of knowledge-and evaluating
the quality of scholarship. There is nothing in the test that would advantage any
particular voice or perspective; on the contrary, the test that I propose would
unchain the engine of creativity, for it would in effect add points for tackling
unusual problems in unusual ways. It would promote and harness diversity
rather than pushing people toward replicating the style or conclusions of those
who have gone before.
In fact, the patent law anticipates the possibility that the evaluators might
prefer inventions of one kind rather than inventions of another. Section 103,
the provision requiring that inventions be nonobvious, includes another tantaliz-
ing line: "Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the
invention was made. '62 The sentence was intended to overturn some older
cases adhering to what was known as the "flash of genius" test 63-the idea
that the more trial-and-error went into an invention, the less its suitability for
a patent-but it is just as applicable to the idea that some scholarly modes are
superior to others. The relevant question should not be, as I sometimes hear
murmured, whether one line of attack on a problem is "promising" or not, for
that implies the comparative judgment that section 103 forbids; rather, the
relevant question should be what has resulted from the particular mode that the
scholar has selected for work.
One might object, of course, that majoritarian faculties, as Johnson calls
them, will not apply the patent-style test fairly, and that is always a possibility.
But at least it is a test that would put all arguments on the same footing; if one
wants to say that this article by Scholar Black is better than that article by
60. For a discussion of the differing breadth of protections for different inventions, see Merges &
Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV 839 (1990).
61. This is, I suppose, an argument in favor of hiring relatively productive rather than relatively
unproductive scholars: assuming equal skill, the productive scholar will advance human knowledge more
often than the unproductive one will
62. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
63. See, e.g., Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941). Cuno Corp
was overruled by the 1952 Patent Act's "nonobviousness" requirement, as confirmed in Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
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Scholar White, one at least now has rules within which the battle can be fought,
and the possibility of agreed rules is a considerable improvement over the
current situation, in which there are as many versions of the rules for evaluation
as there are evaluators.
To summarize, then, what it means to say that good scholarship must
advance human knowledge: first, the scholar must demonstrate command of
the relevant field, not through stringing together unnecessary citations but
through making plain an appreciation of the work that has gone before; second,
the argument must be new, meaning that it has not been said before; and third,
the argument must be nonobvious, meaning that a scholar of ordinary skill,
turning to the same problem with the same tools would not produce essentially
the same argument.
V
Before I close, I should make one small point about the debate over what
Johnson calls the existence and worth of the voice of color. As I have said
already, I have no doubts that scholars of color, like all people of color, are
affected by their backgrounds and, one hopes, inspired by them. I do object
strongly to suggestions that some conclusions reached by scholars of color are
more sensitive to the true voice of the oppressed than others. Loyalty tests are
always disturbing, particularly in the academic world, where the expression of
ideas should be freest.
Johnson, I hope, shares this view. As he says in closing his article, "It is
our differences that strengthen us in our quest to achieve this common objec-
tive. If we lose sight of this common objective and engage in vitriolic debate
concerning which viewpoint is 'correct,' we will then let our differences divide
us, and our shared objective will never be realized."' What is most important
in the debate, therefore, is not whether my argument (or Johnson's or anyone
else's) is accepted or rejected; it is, rather, that a debate continue. The legacy
of racial oppression rests heavily on the shoulders of people of color in Aieri-
ca, and the question of how best to lift it motivates all of us who enter this
fray. Our problems are too large, and too complex, for us to suppose that some
solutions are a priori not to be proposed. It is time to step away from labels
and categories, time to stop worrying about who is writing from what perspec-
tive, time instead to join together in open and robust and healthy dialogue over
the shape of the future. The future, after all, has a way of happening to us,
whether we take the time to talk about it or not.
64. Johnson, supra note 4, at 2063.
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